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Investigating the audit fee structure of local 
authorities in England and Wales 
Gary Giroux and Rowan Jones* 
Abstract-The purpose of this paper is to model and test the audit fee structure of local authorities in England and 
Wales, with particular interest in fees charged by the Big 4 and other private sector auditors. The Audit 
Commission, a national public body under Parliament, regulates local government audits in England and Wales. 
The Audit Commission sets audit standards, appoints the auditors, and establishes a formula to determine standard 
audit fees. Constrained by the standard audit fees, each local authority and its auditor negotiate the actual audit fees. 
The majority of audits are conducted by district auditors (public sector employees under the Audit Commission), 
although about 25% of local authorities are audited by one of six private auditors (including three of the Big 4). 
Regression results for financial year 2000/01 have high explanatory power and work well to explain fee differences. 
Model relationships are somewhat different from US counterparts (which is the context of most of the audit eco- 
nomics literature) and type of authority partially explains fee differences. OLS regression results indicate a Big 4 
discount for local authority audits. Because of expected self-selection bias, the Heckman procedure is used to 
analyse the differences between private sector and public sector auditors, which indicates no selection bias for Big 
4 firms, although bias is present for private firms as a whole and district auditors in some models. When fees are 
size-adjusted, results continue to show a Big 4 discount. The Big 4 discount was robust to other follow-up tests. 
Key words: Audit fees; local government 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this paper is, for the first time, to 
model and test the audit fee structure of local au- 
thorities in England and Wales,' a setting in which 
dependence on central government may become 
less marked and governance more important, as 
one part of the greater accountability of public sec- 
tor organisations in the 21st century. The Audit 
Commission, which is a national body under 
Parliament and the regulator of local authority au- 
dits in England and sets audit standards 
for all local authorities and appoints the auditors 
for all local authorities. Most audits are conducted 
by district auditors (DAs), who are in-house audit 
providers of the Audit commission, operationally 
independent of the commission and, in particular, 
of the commission's regulatory functions. 
The Audit Commission has the choice of auditor 
for all authorities and can use private sector audi- 
*The authors are, respectively, at Texas A&M University 
and the University of Birmingham. They would like to thank 
Martin Evans and Mike Norman at the Audit Commission for 
their interest and assistance on this project; however, this 
paper and the views ycpressed are the sole responsibility of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Commission. They thank Larry Johnson, Mike Wilkins, Scott 
Whisenant, Mike Kinney, Mary Lea McAnally, Jap Effendi, 
Ed Douthett, Tom Omer and two anonymous reviewers for 
comments on this paper, and Anup Srivastava for comments 
and research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the August 2003 American Accounting 
Association national meeting. Correspondence should be ad- 
dressed to Professor Rowan Jones, Birmingham Business 
School, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham 
B15 2TT. E-mail: R.Jones@bham.ac.uk 
This paper was accepted in December 2006. 
tors. For the financial year 2000/01, the private 
audit firms included three of the Big 4 and three 
smaller firms that have a specialty in local author- 
ities. The local authority negotiates the audit fee, 
based in part on a standard fee schedule set by the 
commission.'' 
Because of the involvement of the Audit 
Commission in auditor choice, self-selection bias 
becomes an issue. Self-selection is an agent be- 
haviour problem. The usual interpretation in audit- 
ing is that clients determine whether or not to use 
~ 
I Northern Ireland has had a distinct form of local govern- 
ment and is not addressed in this paper. Local government in 
Scotland has similar features to local government in England 
and Wales, but there is a specific body for Scotland that regu- 
lates local government audits, which is also not addressed in 
this paper. Thus. our focus is with the local authorities in 
England and Wales, whose audits were regulated by one body, 
the Audit Commission. ' The Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the 
National Health Service in England and Wales, while it was 
created by law and is answerable to Parliament, is not part of 
central government. Central government does appoint the 
members of the Commission but the officers of the commis- 
sion are not civil servants. The technical term in the UK for 
bodies such as this is 'non-departmental public body', mean- 
ing that while the government and Parliament have important 
roles to play in such bodies, the bodies are not part of any cen- 
tral government department. The Audit Commission does not 
allow charging for non-audit fees. 
There were four public audit agencies in the UK at the 
time the empirical work in this paper was carried out. In addi- 
tion to the Audit Commission, these were the National Audit 
Office, the Northern Ireland Audit Office, and Audit Scotland 
and the Accounts Commission for Scotland. The National 
Audit Office is responsible for central government audits. The 
remaining agencies are regional regulators of local authorities. 
The standard fee is explained in Section 2. 
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22 
a Big 4 auditor. Because clients self-select the au- 
ditor, client observations are not randomly allocat- 
ed across auditor categories. The commission 
selects the auditor on some non-random basis (e.g. 
geographic reasons). In addition, private audit 
firms may select out of the job. Thus, self-selec- 
tion still exists and the result is a non-random as- 
signment of auditors. 
A Heckman two-stage procedure is used to try to 
control for the consequences of self-selection. 
Following the model introduced by Chaney et al. 
(2004) for commercial audits, this paper represents 
the first use of the Heckman approach for govern- 
mental audit fee models. A separate selection 
equation (first stage) is used to construct a selec- 
tion-bias control factor, Lambda, designed to re- 
flect all unmeasured characteristics related to 
auditor choice. In the second stage, Lambda is 
added as an additional independent variable in the 
fee model. A significant Lambda indicates a self- 
selection bias, which can be further analysed. 
The standard audit fee is set by the Audit 
Commission, based on the type of local authority? 
However, the actual financial audit fee, the amount 
paid directly for the financial audit, is negotiated 
between the auditor and the local authority. The 
total audit fee, which includes the fees for all other 
audit-related charges, is expected to be within 30% 
of the standard audit fee (Audit Commission, 
2000). The commission recognises that fees may 
be outside this range under some circumstances, 
but seeks explanations when this occurs. 
Although the economic relationships for audits 
of UK local authorities have not previously been 
tested, the audit economics literature associated 
with US local governments is extensive? However, 
the regulatory environments associated with UK 
local authority audits differ from the US context, 
most markedly in that US cities and counties have 
considerable autonomy in operations and the audit 
process. Consequently, audit relationships may be 
substantially different and our understanding of 
important regulatory and efficiency relationships 
may be incomplete. In the UK, we have now seen 
research (for example, Clatworthy et al., 2002; 
Basioudis and Ellwood, 2005) on that other area of 
the Audit Commission’s ambit, namely the 
National Health Service (NHS), but local authori- 
ties are fundamentally different bodies from those 
in the NHS because of the central role played by 
directly-elected local politicians in local govern- 
ment. 
This paper focuses on: (1) actual financial audit 
fees and total audit fees charged for financial year 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
2000/01, (2) the relative fee premium (or discount) 
by comparing the total audit fee divided by the 
standard audit fee, and (3) evaluating actual finan- 
cial audit fees, total audit fees and fee premium (or 
discount) by auditor type. Actual financial audit 
fees are analysed because they are closely related 
to US audit fees. The total audit fees are examined 
since they are used by the Audit Commission to 
evaluate actual financial audit fees to standard 
fees. The fee premium (or discount) is the differ- 
ence from the regulatory benchmark and functions 
as a separate test of relative fees. If local authority 
audits in England and Wales followed the results 
found in US studies, Big 4 firms would charge a 
higher premium than either district auditors or 
smaller private firms. However, univariate and 
multivariate results show a net fee discount for Big 
4 firms. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three 
ways. (1) A model of audit fees in local authorities 
in England and Wales is introduced. While this 
model is of interest in its own right, it has added 
interest given that the context of much of the audit 
economics literature (based in the US) is different, 
as is the context of the parallel work in the UK on 
the NHS. The environment associated with the 
Audit Commission is described in detail. (2) We 
focus on Big 4 audit fees, because a fee discount is 
found relative to district auditors. The fee discount 
holds up in most robustness checks and Big 4 pre- 
miums are not found in any of our models. (3) Two 
particular self-selection issues are examined aris- 
ing from the facts that the Audit Commission se- 
lects the auditor and that, while district auditors 
must conduct audits to which they are assigned by 
the commission, the private sector auditors need 
not do so. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into the 
following sections. The next section describes the 
audit process associated with local authorities in 
England and Wales, emphasising how the audit fee 
is determined. Section 3 reviews model develop- 
ment, specifically how to explain the audit fee 
structure. Section 4 describes the sample of local 
authorities in England and Wales used for empiri- 
cal analysis and describes the statistical methods 
used. Section 5 reviews the empirical results. 
Section 6 includes sensitivity checks. The last sec- 
tion concludes the paper. 
A fuller explanation is given in Section 2 .  
See, for example, Baber et al. (1987), Rubin (1988), 
Copley et al. (1994), Ward et al. (1994), Copley et al. (1995). 
Deis and Giroux (1996). Elder et al. (1999). and McLelland 
2. Local authorities and audit fees 
The Audit Commission database has 409 multi- 
function local authorities in England and Wales (at 
1 April 2000), each of which is the responsibility 
of locally elected politicians. The law requires an 
external auditor to be appointed for each local au- 
thority and determines the auditor’s responsibili- 
ties and Dowers (Audit Commission Act 1998, Local 
and Giroux (2000). Government Act 1999). The Audit Commission 
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Vol. 37 No. 1.2007 
was created by law in 1983 and its members are 
appointed by central government (Giroux et a1 ., 
2002: 12- 14). The commission has the statutory 
role to regulate local authority audits, a role that 
explicitly includes setting the standards to which 
the auditors are required to work and monitoring 
and evaluating the auditors’ work against those 
standards. These requirements include compliance 
with professional auditing standards. 
In addition to this regulatory role, the commis- 
sion appoints the external auditor to each of the 
409 local authorities. There are two pools of exter- 
nal auditors from which the Audit Commission 
chooses. The first pool comprises in-house audi- 
tors, who are known as district auditors, and are 
public officials. The second pool comprises private 
sector auditors including, but not restricted to, the 
Big 4 firms. Traditionally, about 70% of the audi- 
tors appointed are district auditors, the balance 
being private sector auditors. For the financial year 
2000/01, district auditors conducted 303 audits 
(74.1%), while the private sector audited 106 
(25.9%) local authorities. 
For the financial year 2000/01, the Audit 
Commission introduced a uniform method for set- 
ting audit fees for all local authorities.’ This 
method requires that the outputs of each audit are 
set by the commission and agreed with each audi- 
tor. The actual audit fee is determined by each au- 
thority and each authority’s auditor but is 
circumscribed by a standard fee determined by the 
commission. The standard fee represents the judg- 
ment of the commission of the expected audit 
costs, based on authority type and relative spend- 
ing levels, adjusted for cost-of-living differences. 
The new approach was designed ‘to encourage au- 
ditor innovation and efficiency improvements’ 
(Audit Commission, 2000:2). 
Auditors conduct their work in accordance with 
the requirements of the Code of Audit Practice, 
published by the Audit Commission and approved 
by Parliament. Auditors must also take account of 
any supplementary guidance or instructions issued 
by the commission. 
The commission requires the following outputs 
23 
from each financial audit: 
A certificate that the audit of the accounts has 
been completed in accordance with statutory re- 
quirements; 
An opinion on the financial statements (and 
other opinions, as required); 
A statutory report on the audit of what is known 
as a ‘best value performance plan’ (when appro- 
priate); 
A report dealing with matters that the auditor 
considers to be in the public interest (which is 
required by law in exceptional cases); 
Oral and/or written reports or memoranda to of- 
ficers of the local authority and, when appropri- 
ate, politicians of the local authority on the 
results of, or matters arising from, specific as- 
pects of auditors’ work (when appropriate); . An annual audit letter addressed to the audited 
body. 
Auditors perform other audit-related procedures 
for additional fees, including value for money 
work, grant claims from central government and 
various statutory reports. The most common audit- 
related work includes: 
’The new system had gradually been used for some author- 
ities since 1995/96 but was only applied to all in 2000/01. 
Under the former system, the audit fee was determined by the 
commission in setting hourly rates, differentiated according to 
the type of local authority being audited. Total audit fees paid 
were, therefore, the product of actual audit hours and the rele- 
vant hourly rates. 
‘Value for Money’ is the comprehensive term to refer both 
to economy and efficiency audits and to effectiveness audits. 
Auditors have a duty to do such work for their clients (known 
as ‘local value for money studies’). The Audit Commission 
also has the duty to carry out such work, not for each local au- 
thority taken separately, but for local governments as a whole 
(known as ‘national value for money studies’); auditors also 
contribute to these national value for money studies. 
Programmed reviews of the financial aspects 
of the audited body’s corporate governance 
arrangements; 
Programmed reviews of aspects of performance 
management, including the audited body’s 
arrangements to secure economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness in its use of resources, which 
may include national ‘value for money’ studies, 
follow-up work and local ‘value for money’ 
studies;* 
The arrangements for collecting, recording and 
publishing performance indicators (when appli- 
cable); 
The audit of ‘best value’ performance plans. 
All financial years are 1 April to 31 March, and 
the standard fee is set for work to be done in the 
period from 1 November within the financial year 
being audited to 31 October in the following year. 
Because some of this work relates to periods other 
than the financial year, these other periods are also 
detailed. In setting this scale, the commission ex- 
plicitly justifies the effects on audit fees paid by 
local authorities, fees received by the commis- 
sion’s own staff, fees received by private sector au- 
ditors, and the commission’s own finances, 
typically in terms of percentage changes from pre- 
vious years and comparisons with percentage 
changes in associated professional services. 
The standard fee is a function of total annual 
gross expenditure of each local authority (but in- 
cludes turnover on the fund that deals with public 
housing and on the pension fund, when applica- 
ble). It is derived from the local authority’s con- 
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24 
solidated income and expenditure account for the 
financial year being audited (Audit Commission, 
2000). The standard fee function (STANDARD 
FEE) is: 
STANDARD FEE = 
[(total annual gross expenditure * x%) + &y] 
Type of local authority X% fY 
London boroughs 0.0350 I10,OOO 
Metropolitan councils - 
outside London 0.0320 95,000 
County councils 0.0175 95,000 
Unitary authorities 0.0410 95,000 
District councils 0.0875 35,000 
To take a specific example, the city of 
Birmingham, which is the biggest authority in our 
sample, had total annual gross expenditures of 
&1,786.1m for 2000/01. Birmingham is a metro- 
politan council; therefore, the calculation of 
STANDARD FEE is: [(&1,786.1m x 0.00032) 
+ &95,000] = &666,552. TOTAL FEE for 
Birmingham was &632,000 (BASE FEE of 
E573,OOO + E59,OOO in audit-related fees), or 
E34,552 below the standard fee. Birmingham was 
audited by a district auditor. Each local authority is 
expected to set its audit fee within +/- 30% of the 
relevant STANDARD FEE. In other words, the 
total audit fees charged to the local authority 
can vary from 70% to 130% of STANDARD FEE 
(with adjustments for specified areas). Auditors 
can charge an additional 6.5% of total fees in 
‘specified areas’ based on higher perceived costs. 
These specified areas are in the south-east of 
England, where the cost of living is higher? 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
thority negotiated an actual fee lower than the 
standard fee. FEE PREM should be within 30% of 
the standard fee. The Audit Commission investi- 
gates exceptions, which often can be justified by 
the particular local authority but which also can in- 
fluence the local authority in setting future audit 
fees. 
Both univariate and multivariate tests will be used 
to analyse FEE, TOTAL FEE, and FEE PREM. 
BASE FEE and TOTAL FEE are logged for corre- 
lation and multivariate analysis, due to skewness. 
These three measures of audit fees are used be- 
cause of the different perspective of the England 
and Wales local governmental audit market from 
that in the US. BASE FEE seems roughly consis- 
tent with audit fee calculations of US studies. 
However, the TOTAL FEE construct is relatively 
more important according to the Audit Commission. 
This measure captured all audit-related charges 
and this is the measure the commission uses to 
compare to standard fees. 
3. Model development 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the finan- 
cial audit fees (BASE FEE) of local authorities in 
England and Wales, TOTAL FEE, and the relative 
fee premium or discount (FEE PREM), measured 
as TOTAL FEE / STANDARD FEE. TOTAL FEE 
includes all audit-related fees charged by the audi- 
tor. BASE FEE is associated with the six required 
financial audit outputs previously listed. TOTAL 
FEE includes the six required outputs plus addi- 
tional sanctioned procedures such as ‘value for 
money’ (also previously listed). If TOTAL FEE is 
equal to the standard fee, FEE PREM=I. If the 
local authority pays a premium over the standard 
fee, FEE PREM>I; FEE PREM<I if the local au- 
’ The ‘specified areas’. for which there is the 6.58 
premium, are local authorities within the counties of Kent, 
Surrey, Sussex, Hampshire, Isle of Wight, Berkshire, 
Oxfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, 
Cambridgeshire and Essex. “’ This insight is provided by staff members of the Audit 
Commission. 
3.1. Fee model constructs 
Six constructs are used to capture audit fee char- 
acteristics: (1) auditor type, (2) auditor expertise, 
(3) client size, (4) measures of client complexity, 
including demographic characteristics, ( 5 )  audit 
risk factors and (6) local authority type. These are 
discussed below, along with the empirical surro- 
gates used for analysis. The model is summarised 
in Table 1. 
Of particular interest is the auditor category: dis- 
trict auditor (DA), one of the Big 4 accounting 
firms (BIG 4), or a non-Big 4 private firm with a 
local governmental specialty (SMALL). Dummy 
variables are used to identify BIG 4 and SMALL. 
The remaining variables serve as control measures. 
In many US audit fee studies of commercial 
clients, a premium for a Big 4 auditor was found, 
usually associated with the reputation effect (e.g. 
Copley et al., 1995). As summarised by Ireland 
and Lennox (2002), Big N (Big 8 down to Big 4, 
depending on the time of the studies) fee premi- 
ums were found in Australia, New Zealand, UK, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and India. However, no fee 
premiums were found in Malaysia, Norway, the 
Netherlands and South Africa. 
Limited literature also suggests that private sec- 
tor auditors (Big 4 and smaller firms) charge high- 
er fees for local governmental audits (e.g. Rubin 
1992). However, in the England and Wales local 
government context, it has been suggested that 
there is a district auditor premium. This reflects the 
fact that DA is motivated by gross turnover, 
whereas the firms are motivated by profit. That is, 
DAs are likely to perform more audited-related 
procedures than BIG 4 or SMALL. So an audited 
body that has a DA as its auditor pays a marginal- 
ly higher fee but gets more work for it.“’ Basioudis 
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Table 1 
The audit fee model 
Construct / Empirical surrogate BASE FEE TOTAL FEE FEE PREM 
Auditor type* 
Small private firm (SMALL) 
Big 4 (BIG 4) 
? 
? 
Auditor expertise 
Number of local authority clients (CLIENTS) ? 
Client size 
Log of population (LPOP) 
Demographic characteristics 
Log of population density (LPOPDEN) 
Log of average income (LAVGINC) 
AudWcredit risk 
Financial viability (FV) 
Surplus/deficit (SURDEF) 
Debt per 1,000 population (DEBT) 
Authority type 
County council 
District council 
Unitary authority 
London borough 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? ? 
+ + + 
t 
? 
+ 
? 
+ 
? 
*Note: There are three audit types: district auditor (DA), one of the Big 4 accounting firms (BIG 4), or a non- 
Big 4 private firm with a local governmental specialty (SMALL). Dummy variables are used to identify BIG 
4 and SMALL (relative to DA). 
and Ellwood (2005) tested the audit fee structure 
of 369 NHS trusts. They predicted a fee premium 
for Big 4 firms. Regression models indicated sig- 
nificant Big 4 fee premiums; however, when indi- 
vidual firms were tested only one firm recorded a 
significant premium. No Big 4 premium existed 
when total fees (including non-audit fees) was the 
dependent variable. Clatworthy et al. (2002) also 
tested audit fees for National Health Service trusts. 
Neither Big 6 nor mid-tier private firms were sig- 
nificant. Consequently, there is evidence from a 
similar audit market to conclude that a Big 4 pre- 
mium is not likely. 
Following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), the 
number of authority clients (CLIENTS) is used as 
a measure of industry market share. Deis and 
Giroux (1996) use the number of local govern- 
mental clients as a measure of reputation. Mayhew 
and Wilkins (2003) view auditor specialisation as 
measured by market share as a differentiation 
strategy, providing economies of scale and indus- 
try-specific expertise. Higher audit quality, higher 
client satisfaction and lower audit costs are ex- 
pected with this differentiation strategy. Mayhew 
and Wilkins (2003) found a fee premium when 
specific auditors dominate market share, but a rel- 
ative fee discount for audit industry specialisation 
but not domination. The auditor can (1) pass on the 
lower costs due to economies of scale through 
lower pricing or (2) retain the cost savings and 
charge a premium price. Therefore, no sign is pre- 
dicted. 
Client size should be associated with audit com- 
plexity. Population is used to capture relative size. 
The log of population (LPOP) is used in the multi- 
variate analysis to control for skewness. Following 
Bamber et al. (1993) and McLelland and Giroux 
(2000), a positive sign is expected. 
Two demographic measures of client complexi- 
ty are population density and average income. 
Population density (POPDEN) is used to capture 
relative ‘urbanness’ and financial complexity. The 
Gonzales and Mehay (1985) model used popula- 
tion density to control for economies of density, as 
public spending may relate to land area rather than 
population size (Giroux and Shields, 1993). Most 
of the major urban areas have only one local au- 
thority; most of the rural areas have two (a county 
council plus one other geographically smaller 
local authority) so that the public services provid- 
ed are divided between the two. Therefore, most 
local authorities in major urban areas provide more 
services than local authorities do in rural areas. 
Also, certain public services are associated with 
urban areas, such as transport. A positive coeffi- 
cient is predicted. Average income (AVGINC) cap- 
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tures the relative wealth of a local authority. 
Income levels are usually associated with greater 
financial health in US studies (e.g. Deis and 
Giroux, 1996). However, only limited revenues are 
generated from the local property tax base for au- 
thorities in England and Wales. Most revenues 
come from central government and these public 
monies tend to be ‘dependence-based’, that is, rel- 
atively more funding is given to poorer authorities. 
No sign is predicted for AVGINC. The logs of pop- 
ulation density (LPOPDEN) and average income 
(LAVGINC) are used for multivariate analysis to 
control for skewness. 
The audit firms may focus on audit and credit 
risk to determine fees, a possible factor for audit 
pricing differences. However, risk measures may 
differ from US counterparts because of institution- 
al and other differences. Two variables are used as 
potential empirical surrogates for audit risk in this 
environment: financial viability (FV) (Giroux and 
McLelland, 2003) and surplus/deficit (SURDEF) 
(McLelland and Giroux, 2000). Debt per capita 
(DEBT) is used to proxy for credit risk (Baber et 
al., 1987; Ward et al., 1994; Copley et al., 1995). 
Financial viability is defined as general fund bal- 
ance / net revenue expenditures and is used as an 
indicator of relative equity. A low measure can sig- 
nal fiscal stress, increasing audit risk. A negative 
sign is expected. On average, authorities have a net 
equity position (FV) of 0.3% of net revenue ex- 
penditures (CIPFA, 200 1). Surplus/deficit (SUR- 
DEF) is the general fund surplus or deficit, stated 
in pounds (f). Running a deficit should indicate in- 
creasing financial risk. However, only 91 authori- 
ties (22.2%) had a surplus in 2001 (CIPFA, 2001). 
A negative sign is predicted; however, since au- 
thorities can budget for a deficit only if a positive 
fund balance exists to cover the deficit, this vari- 
able may be less important than FV. 
Debt levels are measured as the total borrowing 
of the authorities including bank overdrafts. DEBT 
is scaled by population per thousand. The most 
common debt variable measured in US studies is 
municipal debt. Since the interest is ‘tax-free’ to 
lenders, the interest rates are lower to municipal 
borrowers and debt levels tend to be relatively 
large. There is no ‘tax benefit’ to local authorities 
in England and Wales. Most debt comes from bank 
lending and borrowing from the Public Works 
Loan Board, a central government agency. Despite 
the institutional differences, the interpretation is 
the same. Higher debt levels are associated with 
greater credit risk and a positive sign is expected. 
Local authorities are multi-function entities ad- 
ministered by politicians elected locally, with lim- 
ited power to tax and borrow. There are five 
categories of authorities in this analysis: county 
councils, district councils, London boroughs, 
unitary authorities, and metropolitan councils. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Because each category has unique characteristics, 
dummy variables are used to capture locally-spe- 
cific information. In 1974 there was a major reor- 
ganisation of local authorities and piecemeal 
changes since then. 
London boroughs and metropolitan councils are 
located in major urban areas, each providing all 
the major services associated with local authorities 
in England and Wales. Each unitary authority also 
provides all major services. While every unitary 
authority may not necessarily be in a major urban 
area, each will have a significant town at its heart. 
London boroughs, metropolitan councils and uni- 
tary authorities tend to have larger populations and 
higher population densities. 
County councils and district councils conduct 
the major local authority services for a given geo- 
graphical area. Within any given county area, there 
will be one county council and many contiguous 
district councils. The county council will typically 
provide services such as education for the whole 
area (and therefore across the jurisdictions of 
many district councils), while services such as re- 
fuse collection are provided separately by each 
district council. County councils are often rural 
and usually have low population densities; district 
councils usually have smaller populations, but 
population densities can vary. 
3.2. Robustness checks 
Self-selection bias is a major concern associated 
with audit fee models, especially when Big 4 audi- 
tors are present. Selection bias ‘refers to the bias in 
the estimates obtained by following the usual pro- 
cedures of estimation that ignore the non-random- 
ness of the samples’ (Maddala, 1991: 797). A Big 
4 audit fee premium is a typical empirical finding 
and associated with a brand name auditor provid- 
ing a higher quality audit (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Copley et al., 1995). Each client determines 
whether or not to use a Big 4 auditor, resulting in 
a self-selection problem. As stated by Chaney et al. 
(2004: 53): ‘[Ilt is probable that firms self-select 
into Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditees based on firm 
characteristics, private information, and other un- 
observable characteristics.’ OLS models not cor- 
recting for self-selection produce biased and 
inconsistent coefficients. The error term in the 
OLS model will be systematically associated with 
type of auditor. The Heckman procedure is used to 
correct for self-selection. 
James Heckman introduced his correction for 
self-selection bias in the 1970s to deal with indi- 
vidual decisions about labour-force participation 
and hours worked (e.g. Heckman, 1979 or 
Heckman and Smith, 1995). It has been used in ac- 
counting and recently in the audit fee literature to 
control for selection of Big N firms. Ireland and 
Lennox (2002) tested UK audit fees, using 
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geographic reasons. This is the first potential bias. 
The private audit firms may select out of the audit 
job, also resulting in a non-random assignment of 
auditors. 
I t  is not clear that a fee premium or discount is 
expected for Big 4 auditors of local authorities. 
However, certain Big 4 characteristics are expect- 
ed. Big 4 firms base their product differentiation 
strategies on personnel training. key technological 
advantages, and other efficiency-related character- 
istics (Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). Following 
Chaney et al. (2004), it is hypothesised that Big 4 
firms have higher fixed costs related to technology 
and other efficiencies, but potentially lower vari- 
able costs. Chaney et al. (2004) expect that this 
should result in a larger intercept for Big 4 firms. 
while the slope coefficient should be smaller. 
Client size is the primary driver for audit fees. 
Consequently, a size variable is included as an in- 
dependent variable to control for size; we use local 
authority population in this case. Despite this vari- 
able. size may still be a biasing factor in the model. 
For example. in most audit fee studies Big 4 audi- 
tors are associated with larger clients. That is true 
in this case. The average authority size for BIG 4 
is 25 1,245. compared to 180.954 for district audi- 
tors and 136,544 for small firms. 
Because of the systematic differences in size, the 
error term will be directly related to size of the 
clients. which violates the OLS a 
moskedasticity. To correct for t 
other set of regressions was run with fees scaled by 
population. which provides more reliable t-statis- 
tics. The remaining independent variables are the 
same. An alternative test uses rank transformations 
for fees and population. 
Heckman to compare Big 5 to non-Big 5 firms. A 
selection bias was discovered based on a signifi- 
cant inverse Mills ratio (Lambda), which translated 
into a Big 5 audit fee premium of 53.4% (com- 
pared to 19.2% without measuring selection bias). 
Copley and Douthett (2002) used Heckman's si- 
multaneous equation two-step estimation to 
analyse auditor choice (including audit fees) asso- 
ciated with US initial public offerings. Client firms 
initiating IPOs were more likely to select a Big N 
auditor if they had higher risk characteristics. 
Chaney et al. (2004) found a Big 5 audit premium 
on a sample of UK private firms. They found both 
intercept and slope coefficients significant, indi- 
cating that Big 5 firms have different fee structures 
than non-Big 5 firms. McMeeking et al. (2006) 
looked at why Big N firms earned a fee premium 
for big UK firms, over a long time period 
(1985-2002). They used Heckman's as part of 
their sen si t i v it y anal y s i s , w h ic h indicated that 1 arg- 
er firms with more overseas subsidiaries or more 
non-audit services were more likely to hire Big N 
firms. Lambda was significant only for large client 
firms. Omer et al. (2006) considered auditor-pro- 
vided tax services for 2002-2003, using an abnor- 
mal audit fee more to determine unexpected audit 
fees. Disclosure of tax fees was voluntary and 
Heckman's was used to control for the voluntary 
nature of tax fee disclosure (i.e.. disclosure of tax 
fee was self-selected in this time period). The ex- 
tant literature using Heckman's indicates a Big N 
fee premium larger than expected based on OLS 
regression. However, our analysis focuses on a 
unique environment and a different self-selection 
bias. 
The auditor selection process for U K  local au- 
thorities is different relative to the extant US liter- 
ature, with the Audit Commission making the final 
auditor choices. Self-selection is still an econo- 
metric problem but is based on unobserved char- 
acteristics of the Audit Commission and potential 
auditors. A key point is that the private auditors 
can decline audits, while district auditors cannot 
An objective of the Audit Commission is to have 
three potential auditors for each authority: i.e.. the 
regional district auditor's office and two private 
firms (Audit Commission, undated). Consequently. 
the selection incentives differ from other environ- 
ments. 
Since the Audit Commission assigns the auditor. 
there are two possible biases. Whether the coni- 
mission picks a DA presumably depends on vari- 
ous factors. but it may select Big 4 and other 
private auditors on a non-random basis. such as for 
I '  This w i i p l e  of 400 ;ititlioritielr includes the Corporation 
of  London. which is a busincss district olf'icially liatcd wi th  ;I 
population of ii few thou\itnd. This obscrvation was dropped 
from the empirical analysis. 
4. Sample and method 
The sample is based on the data files of the Audit 
Commission, which includes 409 multi-function 
local authorities." Information on audit fees and 
related data comes from the commission files. 
Financial information on the local authorities 
comes from the Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA. 2001 ). Income 
data is taken from Inland Revenue Statistics 
(Reade, 2000). 
The initial testing of the audit fee models uses 
OLS regression. The dependent variables are ( 1  ) 
FEE. (2) TOTAL FEE and (3) FEE PREM. The 
major independent var i a b I es are dummy vari a b I es 
for SMALL and BIG 4. to discern if these are sig- 
nificantly different from fees charged by the dis- 
trict auditors. Diagnostic tests include tests for 
normality of residuals. extreme values. multicolin- 
earity and honioskedasticity. Extreme values were 
detected in various models and deleted from the 
sample for multivariable analysis. Extensive 
heteroskedasticity was discovered and White's 
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correction was used to restate t-values in the re- 
gression models. 
To correct for self-selection bias, the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage procedure is used for the TOTAL 
FEE model. In the first stage, a probit model is 
used as an auditor choice model, using the dummy 
variable BIG 4.'* The independent variables proxy 
for client attributes associated with the selection 
process. The variables are: LPOP, LPOPDEN, 
LAVGINC, county council, district council, uni- 
tary authority, London borough, and CLIENTS. 
First stage results are presented in Table 6.  The 
predicted values from the probit models are trans- 
formed into the inverse Mills Ratios (Lambdas), 
probability functions of the selection decision. 
Lambda is the self-selection variable used in stage 
two. 
The second stage is OLS regression, split by 
BIG 4/district auditor (and private/district auditor), 
with and without Lambda. With the exception of 
Lambda, the model is the same as described above. 
The coefficients for the Lambdas are the estimates 
from the residuals of the auditor choice models. 
(See Chaney et a]., 2004: 54-58 for a more de- 
tailed discussion of the Heckman two-stage proce- 
dure.) Second stage results are summarised for the 
BIG 4 model using TOTAL FEE. 
OLS results were rerun where the dependent 
variables were ( 1 )  log of FEE per 1,000 population 
and (2) log of TOTAL FEE per 1,000 population. 
Interestingly, there were no diagnostic problems 
with these models. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
than standard, although all were above the 70% 
expected minimum. The remaining 357 authorities 
(87.5%) charged a premium, with 89 (21.8%) 
above the 130% expected maximum. Fourteen of 
these extreme premium firms had fees above 
150%; that is, over 50% above the standard fees. 
The commission investigates the authorities pay- 
ing more than the 30% premium. The most com- 
mon explanations for higher fees were (1) high 
audit risk and/or (2) the statistical calculations on 
which the standard fees were based were inappro- 
priate. In most cases, the commission was satisfied 
with the explanation. For example, Watford 
District Council had the highest fee premium at 
153.5% above the standard fee. The explanation 
was that this was a high-risk audit and a disclaimer 
audit opinion issued, which was accepted by the 
Audit Commission. Also, 25.1 % of Watford's total 
fees was for other audit services, above the 19.2% 
average for the sample. Watford was one of the ex- 
treme values deleted from the regression analysis. 
Population averaged 192,000, with a substantial 
range of 25,000 to 3.3 million. Mean population 
density was 12.6 persons per hectare, again with a 
substantial range (0.2-137.1). Because of the 
skewness of these two variables, they were logged 
for the multivariate analysis. 
Financial viability (FV) measures the relative 
equity position to spending (fund balance to total 
expenditures). A higher FV suggests lower audit 
risk. On average, FV was slightly positive (0.3%), 
but ranged from a negative 12.9% to 4.5%. The av- 
erage authority has a small deficit of 21 ,223, but 
with a substantial range of 226,466 deficit to 27,203 
surplus. Deficits were found in 287 (70.2%). This 
is a potential indicator of audit risk for the majori- 
ty of authorities. 
Panel B of Table 2 describes fee data by auditor 
category. Big 4 audits were more expensive on av- 
erage at 2132,306, almost 15% above the average 
district duditor fee. However, the average fee per 
1,000 was the lowest for the Big 4 at &690 per 
1,000 population. Both standard fees and total fees 
had the same relationships by auditor type. The av- 
erage fee premium was the lowest for BIG 4 audits 
at 112.6% (that is, the Big 4 audit premium was 
12.6% above standard fees on average). The aver- 
age fee premium for DA was 119.1% (19.1% 
above standard). A t-test was run (Satterthwaite 
method for unequal variances) comparing DA with 
private sector auditors. District audit fees were sig- 
nificantly higher only for fee per thousand and fee 
premi um . 
Local authorities are analysed in Table 3, cross- 
classified by auditor category in Panel A and by 
means for the continuous independent variables in 
Panel B. The majority of the local authorities are 
district councils (58.3%), but these also have the 
smallest populations, averaging less than 100,000. 
5.  Results 
5.1. Univariate analysis 
Table 2 summarises means and distribution char- 
acteristics (standard deviation, minimum and max- 
imum) of the variables of interest. Base audit fee 
averaged 21 18,000, or 2759 per 1,000 population. 
The total fee (which included non-recurring 
charges for statutory reports, fees for best value 
plans, and audits of grant claims from the central 
government) was 2146,232 or about 24% above 
the base audit fee. The average standard fee set by 
the Audit Commission was 2126,794, 17.8% 
below the total fee, on average. The relative dis- 
counted or premium fee ranged from 71.9% to 
253.5% (with 100% meaning total fee was identi- 
cal to the standard fee). 
Fifty-one authorities ( 1  2.5%) charged fees less 
"Two models are run. The first comparison is Big 4 to dis- 
trict auditors and the second, private to district auditors. In the 
first model, SMALL firms are deleted. However, an important 
consideration is the distinction of district auditors to all private 
firms. Consequently, this second approach also is used. 
Heckman also was run for the BASE FEE and FEE PREM 
models. However, no independent variables were significant 
including Lambda in the FEE PREM model. Only the TOTAL 
FEE using BIG 4 is tabulated. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive analysis 
Panel A: Continuous variables used for  analysis 
Variable* Mean Standard deviation 
Base audit fee 
Fee per thousand 
Total fee 
Standard fee 
Fee premium 
Population 
Population density 
Average income 
Number of clients 
Financial viability 
Surplus/deficit 
Debt per thousand 
E118,003 
E758.6 
f 146,232 
f 126,794 
117.8% 
192,O 15 
12.58 
E20,320 
58.6 
0.3% 
E( 1,223) 
E128.7 
&90,383 
E410.1 
E98,141 
&85,585 
,183 
246,618 
19.05 
E5,767 
24.1 
0.005 
f3,121 
E140.8 
Panel B: Audit Fees by auditor category 
Wiriable District auditor Small private auditor 
Base fee & I  16,238 &93,563 
Fee per thousand 778 746 
Total fee .f 145,833 E l  10.554 
Standard fee E 124,500 E97,232 
Fee premium 119.1% 120.1% 
Minimum 
f30,OOO 
f87.2 
E45,OOO 
E42,359 
7 1.9% 
25,000 
0.20 
&12,900 
4 
-0.129 
E( 26,466) 
0 
Big 4 auditor 
E132,306 
690 
f 159,435 
&144,824 
112.6% 
Maximum 
&623,774 
53403 .O 
&679,927 
f666,524 
253.5% 
3,332,800 
137.10 
&86,500 
85 
0.045 
&7,203 
f982.7 
T-value 
4 . 7  1 
1.67** 
4 . 2 0  
-0.98 
2.36** 
* Actual audit fee, fee per 1,000 population, total fee, standard fee, and average income are stated in E, popu- 
lation density is persons per hectare, number of clients is number of authority audit clients by auditor, finan- 
cial viability is the ratio of general fund balance to total expenditures, surplus/deficit is general fund revenues 
minus expenditures stated in f ,  and debt per capita is total debt per 1,000 population stated in E. 
** Significant at 0.05 (t-test using the Satterthwaithe method, comparing district auditors to private auditors). 
There are only 34 county councils (8.3%), but 
these have the largest populations on average. Big 
4 firms audited a much larger percentage of coun- 
ty councils (38%), London boroughs (31%), and 
metropolitan councils (25%). These categories 
tend to have larger and wealthier populations. 
Population density varied from 2.6 for county 
councils to 60.2 for London boroughs. Only dis- 
trict councils reported relatively large financial vi- 
ability, at 0.5% of net revenue expenditures. All 
authority types reported an average general fund 
deficit, over &4,000 at Metropolitan Councils. 
DEBT also varied by category, from &7 1 at to &338 
at London Boroughs. 
Table 4 presents a Pearson's correlation matrix 
for the variables in the regression models. As ex- 
pected, BASE FEE and TOTAL FEE are both sig- 
nificantly correlated with POP and POPDEN, but 
FEE PREM is negatively correlated with POP. 
Smaller authorities tend to pay larger fee premium 
percentages. Neither SMALL nor BIG 4 is corre- 
lated with BASE FEE or TOTAL FEE, although 
BIG 4 is negatively correlated with FEE PREM. 
All authority types are correlated (either positively 
or negatively) with both BASE FEE and TOTAL 
FEE. Both BASE FEE and TOTAL FEE are posi- 
tively correlated with CLIENTS and DEBT and 
negatively correlated with financial viability and 
surpluddeficit. FEE PREM is correlated (either 
positively or negatively) with two of the authority 
types. FEE PREM also is positively correlated 
with financial viability and surplus/deficit. 
Generally, the correlation results were similar be- 
tween BASE FEE and TOTAL FEE, but quite dif- 
ferent for FEE PREM." Across the independent 
variables, there are some significant correlations; 
however, variance inflation factors used in the re- 
gression models are all below 10, a common rule 
of thumb to indicate no multicollinearity problems 
(Gujarati, 1995). 
5.2.  OLS regression analysis 
Regression results are summarised in Table 5.  
Separate OLS results are presented for BASE 
FEE, TOTAL FEE and FEE PREM. Observations 
l 3  Since STANDARD FEE is a linear function of total ex- 
penditures, it is likely that actual audit fees are relatively lower 
as size increases. That is, audit fees are not expected to rise as 
fast as total expenditures. The result is consistent with oppo- 
site signs for FEE PREM. 
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30 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Table 3 
The types of local authorities in England and Wales 
Panel A: Sample frequency by auditor category 
District 
Authority type auditor 
(58.8%) 
(76.9%) 
(68.8%) 
(69.4%) 
(77.9%) 
(74.3%) 
County council 20 
District council 183 
London borough 22 
Metropolitan council 25 
Unitary authority 53 
Total 303 
Small 
private 
auditor 
1 
(2.9%) 
18 
(7.6%) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(5.6%) 
4 
(5.9%) 
25 
(6.1%) 
Big four 
auditor 
13 
(38.2%) 
37 
(15.6%) 
10 
(31.3%) 
9 
(25.0%) 
1 1  
(16.2%) 
80 
(19.6%) 
Total 
34 
(8.3%) 
238 
(58.3%) 
32 
(7.8%) 
36 
(8.8%) 
68 
(16.7%) 
408* 
( 100%) 
*Chi-square for auditor type by authority type = 16.48, significant at 0.05 
Panel B: Means for continuous independent variables by authority type 
POP AVG 
Authority type POP DEN INC FV 
County council 677,174 2.56 20,476 0 .OOOO 1 
District council 95,538 6.19 20,473 0.00523 
London borough 224,850 60.24 27,456 0.00004 
Metropolitan council 309,122 19.99 17,303 0.00003 
Unitary authority 209,654 13.62 17,944 0.00007 
SUR 
( D W  DEBT 
E(964) E133.0 
f(609) 570.8 
&(2,333) f338.0 
&(4,008) f243.1 
&( 1,577) E178.4 
** POP DEN=population density; AVG INC= average income; FV=financial viability; SURDEF=surplus/deficit; 
DEBT=debt per 1,000 population. 
were lost from the full sample due to missing data 
and extreme values which were deleted. The final 
sample sizes were 380 for BASE FEE and TOTAL 
FEE, and 381 for FEE PREM. Regression diag- 
nostics included variance inflation factors to test 
for multicollinearity, studentised residuals to test 
for extreme values, and the Glejser test for het- 
l 4  It may be that the close relationship between district au- 
ditors and the commission has an effect on audit fees. The ar- 
gument is that DAs have an incentive to charge higher fees, 
since the Audit Commission benefits financially from the fees 
charged. The commission states that a fee premium exists for 
district auditors, because they perform additional duties be- 
yond the private audit firms. As stated by an Audit 
Commission executive: ‘It is perhaps not surprising that the 
“brand name” of the Big 4 does not attract a price premium, as 
the audited bodies are not purchasing the brand! It is the 
commission that buys the brand, and appoints the auditor.’ 
However, Basioudis and Ellwood (2005) found a BIG 4 pre- 
mium for NHS entities, where auditors also are selected by the 
Audit Commission. 
eroskedasticity. Extreme values were detected and 
eliminated and White’s correction run because of 
detected heteroskedasticy. All variance inflation 
factors except district council were below five, 
suggesting no multicollinearity problems. district 
council consistently had VIFs about 6.5, moder- 
ately problematic but not a variable that could be 
eliminated or transformed. 
The BASE FEE model is significant, with an ad- 
justed R2 of 90.1 %. LPOP and LPOPDEN are pos- 
itive and significant as expected, while LAVGINC 
is negative and significant. The negative sign can 
be interpreted as an indicator of increased audit 
risk to local authorities as income levels rise. BIG 
4 is negative and significant. Similar to the uni- 
variate findings, BIG 4 audits are associated with 
lower audit fees, when compared with district au- 
ditors. In most comparable settings ‘brand name’ 
audits typically have a higher price (Rubin 
1988).14 SMALL firm audit fees, on the other 
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32 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Table 5 
Regression analysis with coefficient (t-value) 
(extreme values eliminated, White's correction) 
Predicted sign 
LPOP + 
LPOPDEN + 
LAVGINC ? 
SMALL ? 
BIG 4 ? 
County council ? 
District council ? 
Unitary authority ? 
London borough ? 
CLIENTS ? 
FV - 
SURDEF - 
DEBT + 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F Value 
n 
* Significant at 0.01; ""Significant at 0.05 
Log (BASE FEE) 
0.315 
(10.10)* 
0.060 
(5.25)* 
4 .151  
(-2.54)"" 
0.005 
(0.08) 
4 .149  
(-3.66)" 
4 .339 
(-5.1 O)* 
4 .864 
(-15.23)* 
4 .030  
(4.58) 
0.111 
(1.79) 
4 .oo 1 
(-1.82)** 
(4.66) 
4 .000  
(0.15) 
0.000 
(3.1 9)* 
-I 328 
11.879 
90.1% 
267.6" 
380 
Log (TOTAL FEE) 
0.309 
(12.63)* 
0.046 
(5.16)" 
4 .124  
(-2.66)" 
4 .120  
(-2.29)* * 
4 . 1  17 
(-3.66)* 
4 .337  
(-6.49) * 
4.737 
(-1 6.55)* 
4 .006  
(4.16)  
0.111 
(2.25)* * 
4 .oo 1 
(-2.02)** 
4.648 
(4.30) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
0 .ooo 
(4.27) * 
11.838 
92.2% 
345.5* 
380 
FEE PREM 
4.075 
(-3.36)* 
0.017 
(2.13)** 
0.065 
( I  .53) 
4.097 
(-2.0 I)**  
4 . 123  
(-4.19)* 
0.074 
(1.55) 
4 .028  
(4.68) 
4.035 
(-0.95) 
4 .034 
(4.77)  
-0.002 
(-3 .o 1 )* 
2.417 
(1.21) 
0 .ooo 
(2.62)** 
-0 .ooo 
(-0.78) 
1.026 
I 1.5% 
4.8* 
38 1 
** FEE PREM=fee premium; LPOP=log of population; LPOPDEN=log of population density; LAVGINC=log 
of average income; SMALL=non-Big 4 audit firm; BIG 4=Big 4 audit firm; CLIENTS=number of local 
authority clients; FV=financial viability; SURDEF=surplus/deficit; DEBT=debt per 1,000 population. 
hand, are not significantly different to district audit 
fees. Four authority types are compared with met- 
ropolitan districts; county councils and district 
councils have significantly lower fees relative to 
metropolitan districts. County and District gener- 
ally are rural, suggesting relatively lower fees for 
rural authorities. CLIENTS is negative and signif- 
icant, indicating that industry specialisation results 
in lower fees, an economies of scale interpretation. 
Neither financial viability nor surplus deficit is 
significant. DEBT is positive and significant, in- 
dicative of a higher fee associated with increased 
credit risk. 
The TOTAL FEE model was run to determine if 
the additional audit-related fees have a different 
impact than the original BASE FEE decision. 
While we did not expect a differential impact (be- 
cause all the audit work is required by the com- 
mission), we did test for corroboration. The results 
are similar to the BASE FEE model, suggesting 
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Table 6 
Probit analysis of auditor selection with coefficient (chi-square) 
(extreme values eliminated) - first-stage of Heckman's procedure 
Private auditors 
Dependent variable is Big 4 dummy 
Indeprrident vnr-itrble Co<jfi'cie.nt Chi-,quare 
LPOP 
LPOPDEN 
LAVGINC 
County council 
District counci l  
Unitary authority 
London borough 
CLIENTS 
Intercept 
n 
0.484 
-0.410 
- I  ,576 
0.186 
2.209 
-0.476 
0.104 
1 1.938 
380 
-1.880 
(2.82) 
( I  I .45)* 
(5.66) #' I: 
(4.82) * * 
(0.10) 
( 1 3.79)* 
(0.48) 
(80.10)*' 
(2.51) 
* Significant a t  0.01: "'"Significant a t  0.05 
*'k'k LPOP=log of population: LPOPDEN=log of population densi ty;  LAVGINC=log of average income;  
CLIENTS=number  of local authority clients. 
that there are no significant incentives to charge 
lower audit fees to receive additional audit-related 
work. The Audit Commission has strict rules for- 
bidding non-audit work, which they identify as a 
'regime constraint'. Adjusted R' is 92.2%. The 
only differences in the TOTAL FEE model are: ( 1 ) 
SMALL is negative and significant, indicating that 
total fees are significantly lower than for District 
auditors and (2) London boroughs are positive and 
significant, suggesting higher audit costs. 
The FEE PREM model has an adjusted R' of 
11.5%, much lower than the two previous models. 
The results differ from the other two models, as 
expected given the correlation results in Table 4. 
This model attempts to explain the differences be- 
tween the total fee and Audit Commission's stan- 
dard fee. LPOP is negative and significant, 
LPOPDEN is positive and significant, and 
LAVGINC is insignificant. Fee premiums are rel- 
atively higher for smaller, less crowded authori- 
ties. Standard fees are a linear function of 
expenditures and the negative sign suggests that 
audit fees rise with size at a lower than linear rate. 
Both SMALL and BIG4 are negative and signifi- 
cant, suggesting that on average the private firms 
l 5  An alternative analysis to explain relative fee premium is 
to use TOTAL FEE minus STANDARD FEE as a fee pretni- 
um measure. (Since negative signs are common. the variable 
cannot be logged.) In this model, the adjusted R? is only 
25.78 and LOGPOP is insignificant. SMALL. BIG 4 and 
CLIENTS are negative and significant, while all authority 
types are also negative and significant. In other words, the 
same basic auditor-related results hold in this context. 
The Heckman analysis was also run using BIG 4 com- 
pared to DA based on BASE FEES and private firms (BIG 4 
plus SMALL) compared to DA using both TOTAL FEES and 
BASE FEES. 
receive relatively lower fee premiums. None of the 
authority types is significant, indicating that the 
relative premium is independent of type of author- 
ity. CLIENTS is negative and significant. The re- 
sults for CLIENTS are robust across the models, 
indicating the importance of economies of scale 
for audit fee pricing. SURDEF is positive and sig- 
nificant. an unexpected result. This suggests that 
audit fees rise for higher surpluses. Both FV and 
DEBT are insignificant.'s 
6. Sensitivity checks 
6.1.  Heckinan k two-stage procedure 
Table 6 presents the stage one results, based on 
probit analysis. 
Stage-one is a probit analysis where the depend- 
ent variable is a dummy variable where I=Big 4 
firm and O=DA. The independent variables are the 
OLS variables that are consistently significant 
(LPOP, LPOPDEN, LAVGINC, CLIENTS, and 
the four authority dummies). All but LPOP, district 
council and London boroughs are significant.I6 
The second stage (Table 7) compares audit fees 
for Big 4 firms compared to District auditors using 
Log of TOTAL FEE as the dependent variable. 
The 75 authorities using Big 4 auditors are com- 
pared with the 281 using DA. The OLS results for 
both BIG 4 and DA compared with the overall re- 
sults i n  Table 5 ,  are somewhat different. 
Several variables are not significant for BIG 4 
(LPOPDEN, LAVGINC, London boroughs, and 
CLIENTS) and DA (LAVGINC and London 
Boroughs) that were significant in the overall 
(Table 5 )  analysis. However, the overall explana- 
tory power as measured by adjusted R' was 
similar at 91.5% and 93.1% for BIG 4 and DA 
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34 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Table 7 
Regression analysis with coefficient (t-value); dependent variable is log of TOTAL FEE 
Big 4 to district auditor comparison, based on Heckman's two-stage procedure 
Big 4 Big 4 District auditors District auditors 
Variable OLS Two-stage OLS Two-stage 
LPOP 0.293 0.380 0.305 0.480 
(4.39)" (4.20)" (1 1.43)" (6.40)" 
LPOPDEN -0.002 -0.048 0.052 -0.109 
(-0.06) (-1.44) (5.25)" (-1.67) 
LAVGINC -0.146 -0.434 -0.063 -0.734 
(- 1.49) ( - I  .92) (-1.10) (-2.67)"" 
County council 4 .304  -0.528 -0.356 -0.980 
District council -0.707 -0.657 -0.738 -0.656 
(-6.34)j: (-5.65)" (- 1 4.49)" (-10.88)4' 
Unitary authority -0.075 0.329 -0.020 I .049 
London borough 0.1630 0.172 0.085 0.224 
CLIENTS -0 .oo 1 0.018 -0.002 0.041 
(-2 ,SO)" " (-2.65)" 1: (-5.93)" (-3.82)" 
(-0.73) ( I  .59) (-0.43) (2.44)"" 
( I  .24) (1.59) (1.48) (2.81)4: 
(-0.61) ( 1.49) (-3.13)" (2.37)"j' 
FV -1  3.4 12 -10.934 -0.179 -0.410 
(-1.25) (-1.01) (-0.08) (-0.18) 
SURDEF -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0 .ooo 
(4.01)  (-0.18) (-0.39) (-0.65) 
DEBT 0.001 0.00 I 0.000 0.000 
(2.03p j' ( I  .94)""' (4.67)" (4.80) q' 
Lambda (h)  -0.203 -0.482 
( - I  .4l) (-2 50)" " 
Intercept 11.992 1 3 .SO8 11.305 15.583 
( I2.28)$: (9 34) *: (20.96)'" (8.68):' 
Adj. R' 91 .5% 91.7% 93.1% 93.0% 
F Value 13.6j: 68.7*' 330.8* 309.74' 
n 75 75 28 I 28 I 
* Significant at0 .01: ""$Significant at 0.05; h = Inverse Mill's Ratio 
**1: FEE PREM=fee premium; LPOP=log of population: LPOPDEN=log of population density: LAVGINC=log 
of average income: SMALL=non-Big 4 audit firm: BIG 4=Big 4 audit firm; CLIENTS=number of local 
authority clients; FV=financial viability: SURDEF=surplus/deficit: DEBT=debt per thousand population. 
respectively. 
The second-stage approach shows some model 
differences in Table 7.  If self-selection is present, 
it may manifest itself in the change in coefficients 
as well as the intercept between the OLS and two- 
stage models. The Big 4 two-stage results are sim- 
ilar to OLS results. The second-stage Big 4 model 
has four significant variables, LPOP, county coun- 
cils, district councils, and DEBT. All variables are 
significant for DA, except FV and SURDEF. 
CLIENTS switches signs to positive, a results sug- 
gesting a fee premium for increased specialisation. 
Adjusted R' is similar for both Big 4 (at 91.7%) 
and DA (93.0%) and when compared with OLS 
results. The intercepts are roughly similar between 
OLS and two-stage for both Big 4 and district 
auditors, indicating no systematic shift when a 
self-selection correction is applied. 
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Lambda is a residual calculation of the first- 
stage probit regression and represents those factors 
that ‘help’ self-select into BIG 4 or DA, but are not 
captured in the OLS model. In the BIG 4 model, 
Lambda is insignificant, indicating no self-selec- 
tion bias. Lambda is negative and significant for 
DA, which indicates a selection bias. This suggests 
that local authorities that used a DA auditor could 
have had a more ‘efficient’ audit (that is, lower 
fee) by using a Big 4 firm. In summary, the results 
using the Inverse Mills Ratio provide no evidence 
of a direct BIG 4 self-selection bias, since Lambda 
was in~ignificant.’~ 
6.2. Size-adjusted model and other robustness 
checks 
To control for client size, OLS regressions are 
rerun where the audit fee dependent variables 
(BASE FEE and TOTAL FEE) are scaled by pop- 
ulation (Simunic, 1980). The remaining independ- 
ent variables are the same. Results are summarised 
in Table 8. Without LPOP as an independent vari- 
able, adjusted R2 drops to 59.0% in the BASE FEE 
model and 59.8% in the TOTAL FEE model. 
Because of extreme values, sample size is 379 in 
the BASE FEE model and 383 in the TOTAL FEE 
model. After rerunning the model without the ex- 
treme values, there are no additional diagnostic 
problems (heteroskedasticity was present in the 
earlier regressions). 
Results are roughly the same as in Table 5.  BIG 
4 is still negative and significant in the BASE FEE 
model, but insignificant in the TOTAL FEE (BIG 
4 would be significant at the 0.1 level). SMALL is 
insignificant in both models. Some other differ- 
ences are noted. LPOPDEN, CLIENTS, and sur- 
plus deficit are not significant in either model. 
Financial viability was positive and significant in 
both models, an unexpected result. In summary, 
the results are somewhat unsatisfactory. However, 
the key point is that BIG 4 results are robust in this 
analysis, still negative and significant. 
Following Ireland and Lennox (2002), we used 
rank transformation to control for size as measured 
by population. BASE FEE, TOTAL FEE and 
population were transformed into ranks and the 
35 
regressions rerun, with the remaining variables the 
same (results are not tabulated). Results were sim- 
ilar to those in Table 5. The adjusted R2 values 
were lower, 82.2% for BASE FEE and 84.0% for 
TOTAL FEE. Seven of the eight significant vari- 
ables from Table 5 for BASE FEE were also sig- 
nificant with the same signs. The exception was 
financial viability, which was not significant at .05 
(but significant a 0.1). Seven of the 10 variables 
for TOTAL FEE were significant with the same 
signs. In both models, BIG 4 was negative and 
significant. 
To determine whether the results were driven by 
specific private auditors, the OLS models were 
rerun using dummy variables for each private au- 
ditor (three BIG 4 and three SMALL). (Results are 
not tabulated.) All private firm dummies were neg- 
ative and significant for the TOTAL FEE model. 
However, one SMALL audit firm was positive and 
significant for the BASE FEE model (all others 
were negative and significant). This firm audited 
nine local authorities. Unlike the other audit firms, 
the base fees and total fees were identical (averag- 
ing &83,378 or E821 per 1,000 population). In 
other words, this auditor provided no additional 
audit work. 
As an additional test, the regressions were run 
using nominal values for audit fees, size and de- 
mographic variable rather than their logged values 
(not shown). In the earlier models, the log values 
for fees, size and demographic data were used be- 
cause of skewness and long tails. This may under- 
state the impact of the dummy variables and other 
non-logged variables. White’s consistent t-statis- 
tics were calculated according to heteroskedastici- 
ty in the model. The results were generally the 
same in the TOTAL FEE model, except that 
SMALL was insignificant (BIG 4 continued to be 
negative and significant). The local authority dum- 
mies were more highly significant than in the ear- 
lier models. However, in the BASE FEE model, 
both BIG 4 and SMALL were insignificant. 
The regression models also were rerun by local 
authority size groups-above and below the aver- 
age 120,000 in population (results not presented). 
The findings were essentially the same across both 
size groups and comparable to the full sample (ex- 
cept for excluding local authority types). In all 
models, BIG 4 was negative and significant. In 
summary, there is evidence in most models that the 
BIG 4 firms provide a discount, but no evidence 
that BIG 4 charge a premium in any of the models. 
The Heckman results were somewhat different for the 
other models. When BIG 4 was compared to DA using BASE 
FEE, Lambda was insignificant for both BIG 4 and DA indi- 
cating no self-selection bias. However, when all private audit 
firms were compared with DA, Lambda was negative and sig- 
nificant for private firms for both definitions of audit fee; the 
Lambda for DA was significant and negative only for TOTAL 
FEE. This suggests that fees are selected to provide lower fees 
than provided by the other audit category. In other words, 
when private firms are chosen, this provides lower fees than if 
a DA was chosen. On the other hand, when DA was chosen 
(using the TOTAL FEE definition), these districts also received 
relativelv lower fees. In summarv. there is evidence for fee bias 
7. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to introduce a model 
of audit fees of local authorities in England and 
Wales, and test it. The regression results have high 
explanatory power and work well to explain fee 
differences. Descridve analvsis indicates that ac- 
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36 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Table 8 
Regression analysis with coefficient (t-value) (extreme values eliminated); 
dependent variables: BASE FEE and TOTAL FEE divided by population 
LPOPDEN 
LAVGINC 
SMALL 
BIG 4 
County council 
District council 
Unitary authority 
London borough 
CLIENTS 
FV 
SURDEF 
DEBT 
Intercept 
Adj. R2 
F Value 
n 
Log 
(BASE FEE I POP) 
-0.014 
(0.85) 
-0.388 
(-4.48)" 
-0.098 
(0.98) 
-0.132 
(-2.15)"" 
-0.98 1 
(-I 1 . I  I ) "  
-0.215 
(-2.97)* 
0.266 
(3.59)" 
0.458 
(5.1 6)* 
-0 .oo 1 
(-0.53) 
9.673 
(2.39)"" 
0 .ooo 
(1.46) 
0.001 
(4.18)" 
10.432 
59.0% 
46.3" 
379 
Log 
(TOTAL FEE I POP) 
-0.024 
(0.19) 
-0.382 
(4.60)" 
-0.055 
(-0.57) 
-0.108 
(-1 2 5 )  
-0.986 
(-1 1.63)" 
-0.079 
(-1.13) 
0.3 17 
(4.44) * 
0.489 
(5.72)* 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
11.213 
(2.88)" 
0 .ooo 
(1.93) 
0.00 I 
(3.97)" 
10.598 
59.8% 
48.4* 
383 
* Significant at 0.01; **Significant at 0.05 
*** FEE PREM=fee premium; LPOP=log of population; LPOPDEN=log of population density; LAVGINC=log 
of average income; SMALL=non-Big 4 audit firm; BIG 4=Big 4 audit firm; CLIENTS=number of local 
authority clients; FV=financial viability; SURDEF=surplus/deficit; DEBT=debt per 1,000 population. 
tual audit fees are usually above the standard fees 
set by the Audit Commission. Big 4 firms receive 
lower fees on average than district auditors. Audit 
fee differences were noted across local authority 
categories, with London boroughs having the 
highest fees, ceteris yaribus. The actual fee premi- 
um over the standard was significantly lower for 
private audit firms. 
Regression results provided basic information 
on mu~tivanhre r e i ~ c i i m ~ r h j ~ ~ .  &puiiii?irn bf~c.  
population density, and number of clients were 
consistently significant in the fee and total fee 
models. Council types as measured by dummy 
variables also were often significant. Population 
was negative and significant in the fee premium 
models. 
Relative to existing literature, the most surpris- 
ing finding was the negative coefficients for Big 4 
audits, indicating lower fees than those for district 
auditors. Heckman's two-stage procedure, which 
was run as a robustness check because of the po- 
rLmxi;cn' sal%A..&w ~A?&xTs, p~>iir.+d am!&- 
ous results, although the results generally indicate 
that there is, indeed, an audit fee discount for 
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Big 4 audits. 
Additional analysis needs to be conducted on 
local authority audits in England and Wales, espe- 
cially related to audit quality, which is reviewed by 
the commission. The relationship between audit 
fees and audit quality seems especially important 
given the regulatory environment of the Audit 
Commission. Differences in audit quality may re- 
late to auditor type. The models can be expanded 
to capture additional data and factors that may re- 
late to audit economic relationships. Changes over 
time (the regulatory environment has been dynam- 
ic, with substantial changes made over the previ- 
ous 20 years) may show significant differences. 
Time series analysis is encouraged to capture these 
changes. 
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